Abstract-Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a classic type of Cybercrime and can still strongly damage company reputation and increase costs. Attackers have continuously improved their strategies, and the amount of unleashed communication requests has doubled in volume, size and frequency. This has occurred through different isolated hosts, leading them to resource exhaustion. Previous studies have concentrated efforts in detecting or mitigating ongoing DDoS attacks. However, addressing DDoS when it is already in place may be too late. In this article, we attract the attention for the crucial role and importance of the early prediction of attack trends in order to support network resilience. We suggest the use of statistical and non-parametric leading indicators for identifying trends of volumetric DDoS attacks and we report promising results over real dataset from CAIDA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are one of the top threats for the Cyberspace. Attackers have intensified malicious DDoS in speed, volume and sophistication [1] . Aiming to overload target links or servers, DDoS attacks can reach a volume of hundreds of Gigabits per second, generating up to 56 million packets per second [1] , [2] , [3] . In terms of sophistication, attackers launch DDoS attacks taking advantage of the rapid communication infrastructure, computational resource advances and the Big data generated in the network. The sophistication from using geographicallydistributed infected machines (also known as 'bots') allows to employ different Internet connections in order to produce simultaneously thousands of requests [4] , [5] .
Detecting, controlling and restraining volumetric DDoS attacks are challenging. Attackers constantly sophisticate their procedures to launch DDoS attacks and produce very high and longer volumes of traffic congestion. In a nutshell, they follow two phases: preparation and attack time [3] , [6] . In the preparation phase, machines are infected, and the bots coordinate themselves to define the target and launch the attack at the right moment. Attackers can take advantage of the Big data generated in the network to set up the attack and quickly adapt it, if necessary. Bots can learn about the network behavior and maliciously employ this knowledge. Once coordinated, in the attack time phase, bots act very fast Michele Nogueira is a Professor at the Federal University of Paraná, Brazil and Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Mellon University, USA. Email: michele@inf.ufpr.br. Notice: This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be accessible.
against the target generating a huge amount of requests or increasing the size of network packets.
Several studies in the literature have concentrated on parametrically detecting DDoS attacks, e.g. [7] , [8] . However, attack detection approaches are currently limited due to the constant and quick changes in the attack behavior. Further, approaches can not mitigate efficiently these attacks when already in place due to the huge and longer volume of communication requests and high data rate. In face of these limitations, we advocate and reinforce in this article the importance of non-parametrically identifying trends of potential DDoS attacks from their first stages.
In this article, we attract the attention for leading indicators that may early identify trends of DDoS attacks. Leading indicators are a set of general characteristics based on common mathematical properties of phenomena that appear in a broader range of complex adaptive systems as they approach a disruption. By disruption, in this article, we mean a drastic and critical transition in the network state, e.g., when the DDoS attack starts leading the network to a completely unexpected state in terms of load and behavior, incurring large costs as restoration to previous conditions is difficult or sometimes even impossible.
By examining the set of generic statistical leading indicators, one can point out the imminence of DDoS attacks. Thus, security administrators can automate actions for protecting the target by mitigation or preventive approaches. Based on the classic model from the dynamical system theory, leading indicators have attracted the attention for their potential to identify the generic phenomenon known as critical slowing down, present in any continuous model approaching critical transitions. In this work, we investigate the applicability of a set of leading indicators, such as return rate, autocorrelation and variance of network load pattern. Further, we verify the asymmetry of fluctuations in the network states by skewness.
We calculate the leading indicators over time series representing the load in communication requests. The time series are extracted from a real dataset provided by CAIDA (Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis) in which a DDoS attack has been registered. Interesting results from before and during attack kickoff are reported in order to observe changes in the leading indicators. Our findings point out leading indicators as promising, and we expect this article can contribute for more research in order to explore leading indicators.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II overviews the volumetric DDoS attacks. Section III describes the employed leading indicators. Section IV presents analyses over the real dataset. Finally, Section V concludes the article.
II. DDOS ATTACKS
A very simple and the most common approach to launch Distributed Denial of Service attacks consists in flooding a single target server with thousands of communication requests originating from multiple infected machines [1] , [2] , [3] . Hence, the server becomes completely overwhelmed and cannot respond anymore to legitimate user requests. Another approach is to obstruct the network connections between users and the target server, thus blocking all communication between pair of nodes. In face to the geographical distribution of bots and Internet connections heterogeneity, it very difficult to control the attacks. Bots can even coordinate themselves in networks, composing then the botnets. This has produced negative consequences, especially for businesses that rely on their website, such as E-commerce or SaaS-based ones.
DoS attacks have exploited different protocols to cause significant damage to the Internet. TCP, HTTP and DNS are examples of them. Lately, attackers have even exploited social networks and cloud systems to boost the DDoS effects. For instance, Twitter accounts have been employed to boost the DDoS attack against the Greater Manchester Police in the beginning of September 2015 [1] . The security vulnerabilities in mobile devices allow attackers to benefit from the deviceto-device wireless communications, masking malicious code propagation and recruiting an even larger number of geographically distributed devices able to increase the DDoS traffic significantly. Due to devices portability and the distributed communication, the dynamic and adaptive behavior of botnets makes the design of defenses against DDoS even harder.
Despite the most common approach to launch DDoS attack has evolved, volumetric flooding-based attacks seem to still be one of the top ten attacks in the Internet [1] . This specific type of DDoS acts increasing the number of requests or increasing the size of packets. While the increasing number of requests intends to exhaust server processing resources, the increasing size of packets aims to overload network resources, such as bandwidth. In both cases, the attacker deny services provided by the network. Maybe the main difference between the classic flooding DDoS attacks and the modern flooding ones lies in the use of amplification techniques, in which resources that belong to other people are employed to send Internet traffic to the target, including resources rent on the cloud or from hackers that offer Crimeware-as-a-Service (CaaS).
This article focuses on these flooding attacks due to the effortless to launch and huge power in disrupt the state of the network. We abstract from the protocol used to generate the attacks and we concentrate in the main features of a volumetric DDoS attack: increasing in the number of requests and increasing in the size of packets. Based on these two easy to observe features, we study the applicability of nonparametric leading indicators.
III. LEADING INDICATORS FOR DDOS ATTACKS
Being the Internet a complex system, it is liable to have tipping points, at which the Internet shifts abruptly and disruptively from one state to another one (know as critical transition) [9] , [10] . We argue that volumetric DDoS attacks force the Internet to achieve a tipping point, once they change disruptively the network state being in many situations difficult to recover from the attack. However, it is hard to predict critical transitions on the Internet as in any other complex adaptive system, once the state may show little changes before the tipping point is reached. Also, models are usually not accurate to predict reliably where tipping points may occur due to different reasons, such as high variations in the parameters and unexpected behaviors emerged from the network dynamics.
Hence, this work contributes in showing how certain statistical generic symptoms may be used to indicate a volumetric flooding DDoS attack. Regardless the detailed differences in each system, it is known from the dynamical systems theory that the dynamics near a critical transition, more precisely close to a critical slowing down, have generic properties in a range of complex systems. Critical slowing down is characterized by fold bifurcation (disruptive) points, in which dominant eigenvalue as a representation of the rates of change around the equilibrium becomes zero. This suggests that as the Internet approaches such critical transitions, it becomes increasingly slow in recovering from small perturbations.
From the dynamical systems theory, return rate is employed to indicate the proximity of a disruption. However, other characteristic changes in the pattern of fluctuations have been observed in complex systems. For instance, one prediction is that the slowing down leads to an increase in autocorrelation in the pattern of fluctuations. This can be measured by the lag-1 autocorrelation, indicating that the state of the system has become increasingly similar between consecutive observations. Some analyses of simulation models exposed to stochastic forces confirm that if the system is driven gradually closer to a critical slowing down, there is an accentuated increase in autocorrelation that builds up long before the critical transition occurs. A way to estimate the first value of the autocorrelation function is illustrated in Eq. 1, where µ is the mean and σ is the variance of a variable z t .
Also, the a conditional least-squares method could be employed to fit an autoregressive model of order 1 of the form x t+1 = α 1 x t +ε t , where ε is the Gaussian white noise process and α 1 is the autoregressive coefficient. Being α 1 and ρ 1 equivalent, the return rate can be expressed as
Another indicator is the frequency spectrum of the network states, trying to observe an increase in their memory. It is also expected an increased variance in the pattern of fluctuations when a critical transition is approaching. This can be explained by the fact that, as the eigenvalue approaches zero, the impacts of shocks do not decay, and their accumulating effects increase the variance of the state variables. The coefficient of variation is given by CV = SD µ , being SD the standard deviation. In addition to autocorrelation and variance, the asymmetry of fluctuations may increase before critical transitions. This does not result from critical slowing down. Instead, the explanation is that in catastrophic bifurcations such as fold bifurcations, an unstable equilibrium that marks the border of the basin of attraction approaches the attractor from one side. In the vicinity of this unstable point, rates of change are lower (reflected in a less steep slope in the stability landscapes). As a result, the system will tend to stay in the vicinity of the unstable point relatively longer than it would on the opposite side of the stable equilibrium. The skewness of the distribution of states is expected to increase not only if the system approaches a catastrophic bifurcation, but also if the system is driven closer to the basin boundary by an increasing amplitude of perturbation. Skewness is calculated as illustrated in Eq. 2.
IV. ATTACK ANALYSIS The CAIDA "DDoS Attack 2007" 1 dataset is the basis for all presenting analyses. This dataset contains anonymized traffic traces from a flooding DDoS attack held on August 4, 2007. The attack attempts to block access to the targeted server by consuming computing resources on the server and by consuming all of the bandwidth of the network connecting the server to the Internet. Particularly, the attack is called TCPLike SYN flooding, in which a huge amount of regular SYN packets are generated as well as large SYN packets. The SYN packets vary from 60 to 1500 bytes. SYN flooding attacks are one of the most frequent when compared to other kind of DDoS attacks [1] .
The total size of the dataset is 21 GB and covers about one hour (20:50:08 UTC to 21:56:16 UTC). The attack itself starts around 21:13, as labeled by CAIDA, when the network load increases rapidly (within a few minutes) from about 200 kbits/s to about 80 Mbits/s. The one-hour trace is split up in a set of one minute time series. The set of time series has been extracted from pcap files by tcpdump filters. The duration of the time series has been chosen due to the huge amount of date, mainly during the attack, that makes hard to calculate the leading indicators. The size of each file containing information about a time series varies from some Megabytes to Gigabytes, this last case when the server is over attack. The traces include only attack traffic to the victim and responses from the victim. Non-attack traffic has been removed. Fig. 1 illustrates the phases of the attack identified in the dataset. In this letter, we concentrate in the preparation phase and in the attack kickoff time, since our goal is to indicate trends of attack imminence. to 60) and packet size. The goal lies in employing relevant, but simple features in order to predict the attack imminence. Features as packet generation frequency and packet size together can strongly characterize a combo TCP-like attack. High frequencies in packet generation are in general associated with DoS; whereas the size of the packet indicates if the attacker is trying to manipulate the packet size in order to cause network saturation. By the network protocol, packet sizes should be less than 250 bytes.
In order to illustrate the time series extracted from the dataset, Fig. 2 shows two of them from different moments in the dataset. The first is from the preparation phase, and the second is from the attack kickoff time. From these time series, one can observe the fast increasing in the size of packets sent to the network. While in the first time series the majority of the packets are of 60 bytes, in the second time series one can see the transition (red dashed vertical line) from a period in which packets are of 60 bytes to the beginning of a huge period in which packets are of 1500 bytes. The attack starts at the time 30 of the second time series and lasts for many minutes (not presented in the figure). Another interesting aspect lies in the two picks (highlighted by the red boxes) presented in first time series. Despite this time series is from the phase 1, one can observe few packets of 1500 bytes. 
Could we identify trends of the attack at its launching time?
No. Estimating and analyzing the leading indicators during the kickoff time was our straight approach. We expected to have the characteristic behavior of a critical transition at that moment. However, as one can observe in Fig. 3 , the leading indicators behavior is different from those reported in the literature as characterizing a critical transition. Return rate tends to increase, instead of decreasing, then present some variations. The lag-1 autocorrelation decreases, instead of increasing. The coefficient of variation decreases, instead of increasing, as well as the skewness distribution. Hence, the behavior for the leading indicators during the attack kickoff do not present an expected behavior for an imminence of a critical transition. We could not identify trends of the attack at its launching time using these leading indicators.
Could we explore leading indicators in the preparation phase?
Yes. We examine the leading indicators in different time series from the preparation phase. Surprisingly, we have identified the critical transition behavior. Precisely, at the second (20:51) and third (20:52) minutes of the dataset, it is already possible to identify suspicious behavior pointed by the leading indicators. Some other few minutes of the dataset in the preparation phase also presented the trending behavior. An illustration of the leading indicators is presented in Fig. 4 . One can observe a decrease in the return rate and an increase in lag-1 autocorrelation, coefficient of variation and skewness, as expected in the literature for a critical transition. Fig. 5 presents the corresponding time series from the period that the leading indicators have been calculated. One can observe then that the majority of the packets has a size of 1500 bytes and also the frequency of the packets generation have increased.
V. FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSION
This article is a pioneer work in investigating the potential of leading indications on real dataset to early identify trends of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Leading indicators are a set of general characteristics based on mathematical properties of phenomena that appear in complex adaptive systems when approaching a disruption, i.e., a DDoS attack. Observing the Internet as a complex adaptive system, this work gave insights about the potential of leading indicators for identifying DDoS attacks before their kickoff. On the one hand, results showed the particular characteristic behavior of a disruption for leading indicators, i.e. return rate, autocorrelation, coefficient of variation and skewness, when applied in the preparation phase of the attack. On the other hand, 
